The Politics of Unmanning the Front Lines
Jeremy Cohn
Public Policy 101 - Tammy Frisby
Saturday, June 5, 2010
Introduction
It is said that Vietnam was the first televised war. The drama played out nightly on the television sets of Americans as the violence of war was broadcast in gory detail. Television altered the way that the American government and its people reacted to foreign conflicts. The news media was able to personalize war in far more detail than ever before, and the death of an individual soldier or civilian became a much heavier burden on the public psyche. As a result the public became increasingly hesitant to invest American lives in foreign conflicts. This, in turn, affected how the United States prosecuted war.
In the wake of Vietnam and the collapse of the Soviet Union the United States military underwent a major transformation. The goal was a streamlined military achieved by increasing the deployment of advanced technologies while reducing the military footprint. Advanced computer systems had been developed for use in the smart weapons used in the first Gulf War, but it was in Afghanistan and Iraq where unmanned systems began to dominate the battlefield.
In the minds of politicians robotics offered a way to reduce casualties, reduce costs, and improve the effectiveness of the military. To most Americans, robotics initially seemed to provide a solution with no tangible downside. However, as the length of the military operations dragged on, criticism has emerged, especially as the United States became more aggressive with drone strikes in Pakistan.
The Emergence of Robotics
September 11 represented a turning point for military robotics. After the World Trade Center attacks national security matters were pushed to the front of the policy agenda. The public was crying for blood in response to the attack. This opened a policy window for many security programs1, and robotics proved to be one of the most successful programs. Before September 11 military robotics seemed like a battlefield luxury; technology that was possible but unnecessary, and many officers felt that robotics was a distraction from real battlefield technology.
In peacetime citizens did not see the need for a fleet of robots, but in war there is a constant need for development and adaptation to a conflict as it evolves. Robotics, in conjunction with a small force of soldiers and special ops, helped avoid serious American casualties in the opening years of the war in Afghanistan.
In their early history, drones and unmanned craft were used for target practice or as decoys. In Vietnam the military experimented with remotely piloted vehicles. In Desert Storm, computer guided cruise missiles and smart bombs hit their targets with unparalleled accuracy. It was only with the development of compact, complex, computing that it became possible to create autonomous, semiautonomous, and remotely piloted vehicles of practical use on the battlefield. These military robots range from mini-tanks used to disarm bombs to enormous high-altitude spy planes piloted from thousands of miles away. The Predator and Reaper multirole drones in particular have become the face of robotics in the hunt for al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden. Multirole drones have become one of the most effective and reliable weapons in the continuing conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan. Year after year the Pentagon continues to request increases in its robotics budget, particularly its aerial drone budget2.
The Robotics Policy Window
Kingdon describes policy windows as “the opportunities for action on given initiatives, [policy windows] present themselves and stay open for only short periods. If the participants cannot or do not take advantage of these opportunities, they must bide their time until the next opportunity comes along.”3 Afghanistan formed a problem window, as described by Kingdon, into which robotics fit perfectly. The government wanted a swift and efficient war with minimal casualties. The dispersed Taliban forces proved difficult to monitor and attack, they retreated to cities and mountains.
In combating the guerilla strategies of the Taliban, United States commanders found the unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to be invaluable in their intelligence gathering operations in Afghanistan. The drones could patrol dangerous areas relaying information back to soldiers on the ground and commanders in the field instantaneously. The aircraft were also able to dwell over areas for prolonged periods of time, up to 30 hours, which made them excellent at searching and tracking the large expanses of Afghanistan for the dispersed Taliban and Al Qaeda forces. Once the drones were coupled with missiles they became excellent strike craft in and of themselves.
The emergence of the Iraqi insurgency and the proliferation of various IEDs, specifically those used in roadside bombs, tested the public patience with the conflict in Iraq as soldiers continued to die in large numbers even after the cessation of major combat operations. This again pushed robotics onto the agenda as the military began deploying bomb disposal robots across Iraq. EOD robots became so popular in the military that the budget for ground robots doubled every year starting with the Afghanistan invasion in 2001 through 20094. In 2001 the Department of Defense allocated $32 million for the purchase of 7 Predator UAVs, in 2009 the DOD allocated $380 million for 38 Predators and $450 million for 24 Reaper drones5. This large scale demand spurred enormous growth in the robotics industry. The growth in the military robotics industry has also brought domestic applications to light as the Border Patrol, the DHS, and NASA are all developing and expanding their robot fleets.
Shaping Robotics Policy
In September 2002 President Bush published his National Security Strategy of the United States of America. This document marked a major shift in American foreign policy from a reactive stance to a proactive stance requiring aggressive prosecution of international security threats. This policy was developed in the wake of massive public support for military action and aggressive security policy following September 11 and through the early years of the 2001 operation Enduring Freedom and the 2003 operation Iraqi Freedom.
One of the primary goals for the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan was to establish a functioning and persistent democratic system of government in both nations. The security goal was to create friendly governments to help combat terrorist networks and pressure hostile nations politically, socially, and economically.
"As we pursue the terrorists in Afghanistan, we will continue to work with international organizations such as the United Nations, as well as non-governmental organizations, and other countries to provide the humanitarian, political, economic, and security assistance necessary to rebuild Afghanistan so that it will never again abuse its people, threaten its neighbors, and provide a haven for terrorists."6
Over the course of the Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts, the Taliban, Al Qaeda, and insurgent forces developed effective strategies for combatting the superior United States military technology. The Iraqi insurgency began using guerrilla-style attacks and developed improvised explosive devices (IEDs) of increasing number and sophistication. Sporadic rocket and mortar attacks and armor-penetrating roadside bombs led to an ever increasing death toll of American soldiers. In 2006 the Iraqi insurgency launched 30,000 roadside attacks, 5 times the number from 20037. This led to demand for an increased capability for battlefield reconnaissance, airstrikes, and remote explosive ordnance disposal (EOD).
The widespread application and development of robotics was the result of an ongoing arms race between the United States and its enemies. In developing such a technologically advanced military the United States made conventional combat obsolete. This was initially seen in the Gulf War, the Afghanistan and Iraq operations further confirmed the futility of facing the United States on the open battlefield. This overwhelming force, also called shock and awe, strategy employed in the early stages of the Iraq Conflict drove enemy forces underground. In response opposing forces adapted to an asymmetric war of attrition. The goal was to exhaust the United States’ will to fight by prolonging the conflict and inflicting heavy human and financial costs.
Technology Policy
The long term nature of the War on Terror led to a constant struggle of innovation between American forces developing technological counters to battlefield threats while insurgent forces invented ways to circumvent American technology. The widespread prevalence of robotics exists as a result of this need for continued technological improvement.
Without constant investment in battlefield technology the United States would be unable to maintain effective command and control on the battlefield. Without advanced technology the numbers of opposing armies would present a much more serious threat to American foreign policy. Using its advanced technology in Afghanistan, a small American force, equipped with advanced communications and aircraft, augmented conventional Northern Alliance forces and was able to subdue the much larger Taliban force.
The use of aerial drones in Iraq allowed for greatly improved surveillance of roadways and cities. Soldiers on the ground could be notified of suspicious activity and drones could direct soldiers to track down and intercept insurgents. On the ground, robots were deployed with EOD teams to examine and diffuse suspected bombs without endangering a soldier’s life.
In Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan the overpowering nature of American technology eventually forced insurgents to abandon pitched locations and instead to blend into the civilian population. “It's not that the Pentagon believes it can vanquish a near-invisible guerrilla army from the skies — the first rule in the guerrilla manual is avoid concentrating your forces and offering a target to your enemy's air power.”8 The heavy air power of the United States forced opposing forces to adapt, they decentralized their operations and forced the United States to adapt in turn by moving away from a fast moving pinpoint military force. Using remotely piloted aerial drones the United States is able to blanket regions and cities and obtain enormous amounts of intelligence information. This information is also obtained without danger to a human pilot and allows American lives to remain far from danger for most of the reconnaissance process. The rapid, concentrated military force used to take Baghdad in 2003 has given way to a search, seize, and kill methodology as ground forces and UAVs seek to find and eliminate insurgents in towns and cities amidst the Iraqi and Afghanistan civilian populations and the vast expanses of Afghanistan.
Military robotics policy has been mostly written within the military and drone policy in Pakistan has been dictated by the President with little public or legislative input. The only exceptions are legal issues which have been raised more recently. The driving force behind this expansion of Presidential authority can be drawn back to the War Powers Act of 1973 (WPA). Though originally intended to limit the military power of the executive branch the War Powers Act has greatly expanded the military capabilities and expectations of the United States President. The WPA allows the President to initiate military action without Congressional approval, which is only required for additional funding after the initial operation. Presidents Bush and Obama used their role as Commander in Chief, using unmanned drones, to expand the Afghanistan Conflict into Pakistan. This is a continuation of the Bush doctrine of aggressive military action to root out developing threats to the American people and their interests.
Political Ramifications
The public and Congress have held almost unanimously positive views of robotics over the course of the Afghanistan and Iraq operations. Politically, the use of robotics in support roles such as bomb disposal has remained uncontroversial. In 2008, thirty-four Representatives of Congress created the Congressional Robotics Caucus, an organization that offers an unambiguously favorable definition of military and civilian robotics:
Robots go where it's dirty, dull, or dangerous. They reduce exposure to toxins and perform jobs nobody should, as in pipeline inspections. Robots increase accuracy and reliability on assembly lines and improve speed, producing cheaper mass-produced goods. They reduce risk to the military and First Responders, and go where humans can't.9
As long as robotic systems are used in place of humans in dangerous situations, or to supply information to augment human operations, these systems are almost unanimously viewed as positive developments within the United States.
Internal military policy guided the early enthusiasm in robotics as robotics offered unique and effective solutions to many of the problems faced on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan. When a plane is shot down the military preferred it to be a $5 million Predator drone and not a $30 million F-15 with a pilot inside. In the early years of the Iraq War the military demand for aerial drones and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) robots expanded faster than the industry had been able produce them. With this large expansion in the scale and role of robotics critics have raised new legal and political complaints.
There is a fear that the enthusiasm for unmanned weapons of war will increase the likelihood of war because the costs associated with war are diminished. Robots and drones have been actively involved in Afghanistan and Iraq for many years but Congress only held its first hearing on drones in March 2010.
Further complicating the public’s reaction are the multitude of retaliatory strikes in Pakistan from insurgent organizations striking at government territory to lash out in response to the drone attacks, increasing the collateral damage in Pakistan10. The New America Foundation estimates that as much as 32% of those killed in the Pakistan drone strikes are civilians11. Experts at the Brookings Institute believe the civilian casualties could be closer to 90% of those killed in the Pakistan strikes12.
The high civilian casualties have affected public opinion in the United States and in the Middle East. Many civilians in Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan view the use of robotics as an act of cowardice. Civilians in the Middle East lose respect for the United States when they see robots fighting where humans used to be, by contrast the opposing forces are seen as valiant martyrs. However, at this point in the conflict, the United States public’s demand for action in the war against the Taliban and Al Qaeda continues to overpower contrary sentiment.
Policy Intellectuals and the Legal Case
Intellectuals have been the primary factor in shaping the public’s opinion of drone operations. It is only through legal experts that the legality of the operations came into question, in reality the United States public is mostly blind to the events in Pakistan. News reports are only able to report wide estimates of casualties, vague descriptions of targets, and note the possible involvement of United Sates military drones. Many news reports are also quick to note that reported casualties are from opposition forces, groups with an interest in misleading Pakistani and American media. In the case of Pakistan the public’s opinion is shaped entirely upon the opinions of the legal and security intellectual elite. The details of CIA operations are not accessible to the public.
In recent years there has been a mobilization of negative opinion against the development and use of unmanned vehicles in the US military13. This mobilization emphasizes a dehumanized narrative regarding the use of robotics. Detractors claim the drone strikes are indiscriminate and that the military strikes with no regard for human life14. The adverse positions have grown more pronounced and more numerous as more politicians, journalists, and citizens entered the debate. The prolonged involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as US involvement in Pakistan and Yemen, has increased criticisms that robotics has removed the United States’ inhibitions against using military force. These arguments have reached a new height with the Obama administration’s decision to dramatically increase drones strikes within Pakistan.
The United States continues to conduct drone strikes against insurgent bases within Pakistan which raises questions of legality and violation of sovereignty15. Criticism has also arisen over possibility of future drone strikes in Yemen. Detractors have combined with antiwar sentiment and a public fatigue with the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts to create a broad base of opposition against the unregulated use of military robots. Many law professors, the ACLU, and members of the international community have characterized the drone strikes in Pakistan as targeted assassinations, and thus violations of international law16.
On March 23, 2010 legal experts testified before Congress and showed that the United States has not laid a solid legal foundation for the use of drones in states such as Pakistan and Yemen. States that are uninvolved in the Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts. This legal area also applies to individuals who are only suspected of terrorism. “In the view of important voices in international law, the practice outside of a traditional battlefield is a violation of international human rights law guarantees against extrajudicial execution and, at bottom, is just simple murder.”17. They further noted that “under the laws of war, both treaty law of the Geneva Conventions and customary law, indeed accepts that non-international armed conflict is defined, and therefore limited by, the presence of persistent, sustained, intense hostilities” 16. The conditions in Pakistan and Yemen do not clearly meet these definitions. The legal questions surrounding these operations are further complicated by the Pakistani government’s diminished authority in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).
The Pakistan operations began under President Bush in 2004 but have been greatly increased under President Obama18. United States military policy is heavily dependent on public approval which will either sustain or end a war, and in turn a politician. However, issues of secrecy, distance, and conflicting news coverage cloud the public’s ability to judge Iraq, Afghanistan, or military drones in a comprehensive manner. As a result, public opinion on the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts, and drone policy, is almost completely dependent on the opinions of the legal, diplomatic, and security policy experts and intellectuals. The body of public opinion is based on those in the know who speak out on the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts and on robotics.
Alternate Policy Factors
As of yet the courts have had little say in the actions in Pakistan. Legal action has been heavily discussed and Congress has sought legal opinions on the use of drones. One legal expert has suggested before Congress that the law is not clearly defined, but that under certain interpretations the United States may have already committed war crimes in its application of weaponized drones19. While the courts have not had a major role except in shaping public opinion, they may have a much more significant effect on robotics policy in future conflicts.
Unlike most of the topics discussed in this course there is little room for direct democracy or unorthodox legislation. The security and secrecy issues associated with military robotics means that this policy area has grown outside of the public eye. For many years the government has controlled public access, allowing only the unambiguously positive aspects to see the full light of day. The Pakistan policy however remains obscured and as of yet Congress has taken little action20. In many ways this lack of intervention by Congress has allowed the Executive Branch and the Pentagon to shape robotics policy.
Conclusion
Between 2001 and 2010 military robots saw a surge of enthusiasm followed by a heavy wave of criticism. The original argument for military robotics was that it was necessary to save lives and create a more efficient military. Detractors have framed that asset as a liability to American foreign policy because it encourages military action over diplomacy.
Opponents succeeded in combating the enthusiasm for robotics by changing the discussion venue. Instead of discussing the American lives saved they frame the debate by arguing for our moral obligation towards the innocent civilians who are harmed by United States military action. Here we see a strong resemblance to the Downsian mobilization that Baumgartner and Jones illustrate with the nuclear industry, i.e. when the debate expands beyond its initial boundaries and begins to account for negative externalities21. Like nuclear power, the initial enthusiasm for robotics proved optimistic and many of the promised benefits had unforeseen consequences.
Though most of the criticism targets specific systems, many of the arguments apply to a broad array of robotics applications, and others apply to any technology that removes humans from the battlefield. There has been substantial outcry against the use of aerial drones as bombers in Pakistan and many claim that their use has been indiscriminate, hitting civilian targets and military targets22. Others argue that decreased loss of life reduces barriers to the use of military force. The course of public opinion on robotics has closely mirrored public opinion on war as both enjoyed a surge of enthusiasm following the September 11 attacks and both are now experiencing a decline as the public and politicians increasingly call for the US to leave Iraq and Afghanistan.
The ongoing conflict in Pakistan between Taliban, Al Qaeda, tribal, and government forces remains obscured by the fog of war and misinformation. The United States CIA drone operations are one of a multitude of factors that greatly complicate the situation. The distance and nature of the conflict makes it impossible for the average American to reach an informed conclusion. Because of this United States citizens are completely dependent on expert inference and analysis, and the lack of a clear legal justification by the United States government leaves the door open to legal speculation by a range of experts and intellectuals. In the long term, drone operations, and the War on Terror generally, are going to be heavily influenced by the public’s opinion, but that opinion is going to be constantly formed by the opinions of government officials, lawyers, and military experts and the opinions that they put forward.
Robotics has the potential to completely redefine every aspect of national security. The current robotics policy of the United States has been shaped by an aggressive high-technology national security policy developed under President Bush and continued under President Obama. For most of its developmental years robotics policy has escaped exhaustive public and Congressional debate.
The United States’ tendency toward interventionism has made American military policy fluid. Military action has become easier, requiring only Presidential action, as enabled in the War Powers Act. This has made security issues a much more dangerous area politically for Congress. Once military action has begun any opposition is easily characterized as being soft on security or in opposition to our soldiers. As a result, the debate over robotics policy has grown organically from existing foreign policy and generating objective debate has proven difficult.
Americans do not have clear knowledge or understanding of the issues at hand in the Pakistan drone operations. Unlike discussions of healthcare or immigration, where many citizens have first hand or anecdotal experiences, the drone operations are both distant and secret. The Brookings and New America Foundation studies cited within this memo are both quick to note the uncertainty involved as Pakistan continues to walk the fine line between claims of sovereignty and United States involvement. The most expert academic research on the topic is forced to rely on uncertain data. The facts on the ground remain very murky to most of the military and expert personnel involved, which means that the general public is unable to reach an informed opinion on the matter.
